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The New Challenge to Native Identity: 
An Essay on “Indigeneity” and “Whiteness” 
Rebecca Tsosie* 
INTRODUCTION 
It has never seemed controversial that Native peoples in the 
United States are “indigenous.” In fact, pow-wow pundits often joke 
that in the 1940s, “Indians” were classified by U.S. census takers as 
being of the “Mongolian race,” and then, by the 1960s, they had their 
own “American Indian” category, until the 1980s, when they became 
“Native American.” However, that term became somewhat 
discredited in the 1990s when Native political activists disclaimed 
“American” identity in favor of the more globally politically correct 
term “indigenous peoples.”1 “Today,” the joke continues, “I’m 
Other.”2 This joke has always inspired enthusiastic howls from the 
crowd, most of whom understand themselves in the context of a 
particular tribal identity—Dine, Tohono O’odham, Lakota. 
Unfortunately, however, the tide has turned. Now there is a concerted 
effort to challenge the notion of “indigeneity” and to suggest that the 
concept is somehow distinct from Native identity, and furthermore, 
may be constructive of Euro-American identity!3 This essay builds 
upon Cheryl Harris’s claim that “whiteness” is a form of “property” 
and suggests that the current challenges to Native “indigeneity” 
 * Lincoln Professor of Native American Law and Ethics and Executive Director, Indian 
Legal Program, Arizona State University College of Law.  
 1. Wallace Coffey, Remarks at the Arizona State University Cultural Sovereignty 
Lecture (Jan. 21, 2000). Mr. Coffey, a Comanche tribal leader and pow-wow emcee told this 
joke at a lecture on Cultural Sovereignty at Arizona State University. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Christina Stage, We Celebrate 100 Years: An “Indigenous” Analysis of the 
Metaphors That Shape the Cultural Identity of Small Town, U.S.A., in WHITENESS: THE 
COMMUNICATION OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 69 (Thomas K. Nakayama & Judith N. Martin eds., 
1999). 
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respond to the perception that “privilege” and “status” have attached 
to the racial and cultural identity of Native peoples in recent years 
through various “special” legal rights.4 This article suggests that, with 
respect to indigenous peoples, the discourse of “whiteness” requires 
analysis within a global, as well as national context. This article 
examines four areas within which there is an active debate over 
“indigenous status”: political rights under international human rights 
law; cultural rights under international human rights law; rights to 
land and to ancestral human remains under domestic law; and rights 
to genetic resources. The root issue within each of these areas is who 
“owns” Native identity—political, cultural, ancestral, genetic—and 
what role does the concept of “indigeneity” play in these assertions of 
“ownership”? The article concludes by suggesting that Native 
cultural sovereignty, including tribal law and tribal epistemologies, 
will have an important role in asserting and maintaining Native rights 
to tangible and intangible tribal resources. 
I. THE LINK BETWEEN RACIAL IDENTITY AND PROPERTY: 
“INDIGENEITY” AND “WHITENESS” 
Critical race theory has explored the legal construction of race, 
providing a point of departure for scholars to discuss the construction 
of “White” identity. The link between racial identity and privilege is 
undeniable and is carefully illuminated by scholarly work on 
“whiteness,”5 and in particular by the theme of this conference, which 
is to explore the ways in which “whiteness” and “white privilege” 
create, entrench, and reproduce themselves. But what possible 
relationship could exist between “whiteness” and contemporary 
debates over “indigeneity”? This relationship is perhaps best 
understood within the context of work on “race-consciousness,” 
which is often held to comprise at least two different aspects. First, 
some scholars have responded critically to the notion that the legal 
system is (or should be) “color-blind.”6 Under this view, we ought to 
 4. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1995). 
 5. See, e.g., WHAT WHITE LOOKS LIKE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS ON THE 
WHITENESS QUESTION (George Yancy ed., 2004); WHITENESS: THE COMMUNICATION OF 
SOCIAL IDENTITY (Thomas K. Nakayama & Judith N. Martin eds., 1999). 
 6. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 19 
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explicitly recognize and encourage recognition of races and racial 
difference. Second, scholars increasingly acknowledge the 
importance of race to personal identity and world view.7 This 
perspective seems to respond to the idea that constituent citizens of a 
“color-blind” society ideally engage from an “objective, race-less 
perspective.”8 If our race, ethnicity and culture produce our 
individual identity, then we are constituted as members of groups and 
not purely as individuals. The values shared by members of those 
groups—however different from those of other groups—inform our 
particular “race-consciousness.” Not surprisingly, the law works in 
concert with social norms that perceive “group-based” claims as 
unnecessary, or even downright dangerous.9 Professor Harris asserts, 
for example, that the law’s denial of the existence of racial groups is 
based partly on a desire to disclaim the continuing effects of past 
(overt) racial subordination, and partly on the liberal notion that 
rights, including constitutional rights, inhere in individuals and not in 
groups.10 Liberalism thus asserts that “equality” mandates only the 
equal treatment of individuals, and does not require that “groups” are 
made whole, even if past discrimination was specifically targeted 
against those groups.11 
Not surprisingly, the bulk of the scholarship on race 
consciousness was generated from “outsider” perspectives initially, 
which expressly or implicitly meant that “whiteness” was the 
unexamined “norm” in the law, and that race-consciousness entailed 
an affirmative recognition of “Black” or “Latino” or “Native” 
identity as an epistemological as well as social phenomenon. The 
recognition of separate group identity as a positive force for social 
change was a key function of the literature on race consciousness.12 
Ultimately, however, some scholars began advocating race-
consciousness as a step toward the elaboration of “a positive White 
(1996). 
 7. Id. at 19–20. 
 8. Id. at 20.  
 9. Harris, supra note 4, at 1761. 
 10. Id. 
 11. A good example of this perspective is the continuing unwillingness of United States 
politicians and their constituents to support group-based reparations for slavery. 
 12. LÓPEZ, supra note 6, at 20–21. 
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racial identity,”13 leading critics to charge that this, in fact, already 
exists and may further subordinate minority identities as “tropes of 
hierarchical difference.”14 The debate over “indigenous” identity tests 
out both theories. How does the construction of “indigeneity” track 
efforts to define “Native American” identity as separate from, and 
prior to “white” identity? And to the extent that the descendants of 
European colonizers now seek to define their identity as “Americans” 
(or “Pakeha” in New Zealand) as different from that of their 
European forebears, how do they use the trope of “indigeneity” to 
support their own status and privilege? And what impact does this 
have on Native peoples in those countries? In many ways, the 
ultimate question is one of appropriation, and it is best evaluated 
through a historical, as well as contemporary, lens. 
As Ian F. Haney López has demonstrated, not only is race 
“socially constructed,” but the law is one of the most powerful 
mechanisms available in this process.15 “Law constructs race,” and it 
does so within the larger context of society.16 As social knowledge 
and social norms shift, so the role of the law in constructing race 
shifts. However, as Haney López further notes, the “law does more 
than simply codify race.”17 Legislatures and courts not only “fix the 
boundaries of race in the forms we recognize today,” but they also 
“define the content of racial identities” and use this to “specify their 
relative privilege or disadvantage in U.S. society.”18 
In relation to “whiteness,” Cheryl Harris observes that “the law’s 
construction of whiteness defined and affirmed critical aspects of 
identity (who is white); of privilege (what benefits accrue to that 
status); and of property (what legal entitlements arise from that 
status).”19 “Whiteness at various times signifies and is deployed as 
identity, status, and property, sometimes singularly, sometimes in 
tandem.”20 Similarly, the law is now turning to examine critical 
 13. Id. at 15. 
 14. Id. at 21. 
 15. Id. at 10. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Harris, supra note 4, at 1725. 
 20. Id. 
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aspects of Native identity, deciding who is “indigenous” (rather than 
who is “Indian” or “Native American”) and what rights accrue from 
that status.21 Ironically, the legal effort to define “indigeneity” seems 
focused on narrowing the category of rights-holders in order to 
preserve status and entitlements for non-indigenous people.22 In the 
United States, “white identity” appears to be crafting an “indigenous” 
component.23 
Harris’s work provides a detailed historical analysis of the 
connections between property, identity and the law.24 From the 
country’s inception, America’s social, legal and economic institutions 
utilized conceptions of race and property to establish and maintain 
the racial and economic subordination of non-White peoples. In the 
earliest years, this was done primarily through the use of racial 
hierarchies and stereotypes that “justified” the enslavement of 
Africans and the dispossession of Native people from their lands and 
resources. Jurists posited that both were uncivilized groups of people 
who could not qualify for citizenship or rights commensurate with 
those of civilized persons.25 Africans were deemed to be on the 
lowest order of humanity, little more than chattel, and so, were 
completely subject to the will of their “master,” who could 
“discipline” them (read as assault or murder) at will without fear of 
liability for tort damages or criminal prosecution.26 African 
 21. The Draft Declaration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for example, does not yet 
contain a definition of “indigenous peoples” because of the general disagreement among the 
nation-states about who is “indigenous.” See U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2/Add.1 
(1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration]. 
 22. See generally PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1–
10 (2002) (outlining arguments for and against the conceptual category of “indigenous rights” 
at the international level). 
 23. See Stage, supra note 3.  
 24. See Harris, supra note 4. 
 25. For example, the U.S. Constitution, in its original form, did not consider African-
American slaves or Native Americans full legal persons or entitled to the full rights of 
“citizens”. 
 26. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829) (holding that defendant’s 
assault upon a slave is not a crime against the state subject to prosecution because the slave has 
“no will of his own” and his role in life is purely to “profit” his master). This case demonstrates 
how the law permitted “uncontrolled authority” over the body of the slave without criminal 
liability. The only cause of action available would have been the master’s tort action against the 
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enslavement commodified human beings into a “resource” that could 
be exploited by White “owners.”  
Native Americans were considered by some Enlightenment 
philosophers and politicians to be one step up in the evolutionary 
order.27 They were noble “savages” living in a “state of nature,” and 
these Europeans romanticized their impressions of Native people by 
imagining that at the dawn of civilization their own ancestors likely 
shared such a free-spirited and nomadic life.28 As Thomas Jefferson 
stated in a 1785 letter: 
I am safe in affirming, that the proofs of genius given by the 
Indians of North America, place them on a level with whites in 
the same uncultivated state. The North of Europe furnishes 
subjects enough for comparison with them, and for a proof of 
their equality. I have seen some thousands myself, and 
conversed much with them, and have found in them a 
masculine, sound understanding. . . . I believe the Indian, then, 
to be in body and mind equal to the white man. I have 
supposed the black man, in his present state, might not be so; 
but it would be hazardous to affirm, that, equally cultivated for 
a few generations, he would not become so.29 
Of course, “savages” did not have a legal system or lifestyle 
capable of maintaining actual property rights that would have to be 
respected as a “preexisting legal title” to the lands “conquered,” as 
would another “civilized” nation. Therefore, the Doctrine of 
Discovery that was used to claim “title” by the first European 
sovereign to discover “vacant lands” was extended to lands occupied 
perpetrator for “permanent impairment” of the economic value of the slave. 
 27. See DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 126 (2004) (quoting Count de 
Toqueville’s statement that “[t]he Indians . . . have unquestionably displayed as much natural 
genius as the peoples of Europe in their greatest undertakings; but nations as well as men 
require time to learn”). The actual treatment of Native people, however, was not consistent with 
this view, as demonstrated by the genocidal military campaigns levied against Native peoples 
and the forced removal of many Nations from their traditional lands. 
 28. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY (1755). 
 29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis de Chastellux (June 7, 1785), in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 801 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984), cited in JUAN F. PEREA ET 
AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 185 (2000). 
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by “uncivilized” peoples.30 Native peoples’ occupancy of the lands 
did not constitute legal possession for purposes of claiming title. 
Again, the racialized identity of “Indians” as the “Savage Other” was 
contrasted with the “civilized” European who was capable of holding 
“title” to the land. Like many of his peers, John Quincy Adams drew 
on Locke’s work to assert that Indians had a “questionable” claim to 
title as “first possessors” because these lands “lay in the common, left 
‘wholly to nature,’” and thus were a “proper subject of appropriation 
by one’s labor.”31 “The right of the hunter could not preempt” the 
right of the millions of settlers who actually “needed” the land and 
would make constructive use of it.32 Of course, none of these men 
actually questioned whether Indians were actually first in time. 
Rather, they focused only on the question of why being first in time 
didn’t give rise to the legal rights that ordinarily would follow from 
this status. 
As Harris demonstrates, in a society structured on racial 
subordination, “white privilege” became the expectation and the law 
constructed “whiteness” as an objective fact, designed to govern the 
relationship of different members of society according to the 
reification of a “thing” (whiteness).33 Thus, although slavery was 
ultimately abolished and the reconstruction era-amendments to the 
Constitution enacted in the search for “equality” of citizenship, 
“whiteness” still was used to confer a “host of societal privileges, in 
both the public and private spheres,” including rights to vote, travel 
freely, attend particular schools, and marry a person of one’s 
choosing.34 Plessy v. Ferguson35 stated that separate public facilities 
 30. See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that discovery 
resulted in fee ownership of land in the United States by the British Crown, and then by the 
United States as its successor in interest, except for the Indians’ “right of occupancy”). Most of 
the common law jurisdictions followed this line of thinking to justify the British Crown’s 
ownership of lands occupied by Native peoples, pending extinguishment of the Indians’ “right 
of occupancy.” Australia was the lone exception, deeming Native occupancy to be absolutely 
irrelevant until 1992, when the Australian Supreme Court decided Mabo v. Queensland, [No 2] 
(1992) 175 CLR 1, which provided that Native people had a form of “title” which should be 
respected until the Europeans exercised their “preemptive” right to acquire the land from the 
Natives. 
 31. Harris, supra note 4, at 1722 (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT). 
 32. Id. at 1722 n.46. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1745. 
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did not interfere with equality of citizenship because only social 
rights were affected by these policies and not political rights.36 
Similarly, until the United States Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in 
Loving v. Virginia,37 many state courts upheld laws prohibiting the 
miscegenation of the races as purely designed to protect the “social” 
values and practices of the state and its citizens, and found that these 
laws did not impair any “political” rights.38 
Even after the twentieth-century civil rights era, Harris claims that 
the law’s approach to group identity continues to reproduce 
subordination.39 In the older cases this occurred through the explicit 
“race-ing” of a group: assigning a racial identity that supported the 
perception that the group had an “inferior” status.40 In the 
contemporary era, the backlash against affirmative action has worked 
to “erase” racial group identity. The old “color-blind” notion used to 
overtly discriminate against racial minorities is now used to assert 
that they do not exist!41 We are all “equal” because “race” is 
irrelevant for legal purposes.42 Importantly, Harris’s research 
demonstrates that the “property interest in whiteness” still exists:43 
Over time it has changed in form, but it has retained its 
essential exclusionary character and continued to distort 
outcomes of legal disputes by favoring and protecting settled 
expectations of white privilege. The law expresses the 
dominant conception of “rights,” “equality,” “property,” 
“neutrality,” and “power”: rights mean shields from 
interference; equality means formal equality; property means 
settled expectations that are to be protected; neutrality means 
 35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 36. Id. at 551–52. 
 37. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 38. See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 750 (1955) (upholding constitutionality of 
statute making it “unlawful for any white person . . . to marry any save a white person, or a 
person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian”); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967) (noting that, as of 1967, Virginia was one of sixteen states which 
prohibited and punished marriages on the basis of racial classifications). 
 39. Harris, supra note 4, at 1761. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1778. 
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the existing distribution, which is natural; and, power is the 
mechanism for guarding all of this.44 
I would like to suggest, at least with respect to Native peoples’ 
rights claims, that we must expand the discussion about “whiteness” 
to include the international dialogue about “human rights” and its 
implications for Native peoples’ substantive rights to land, ancestral 
remains, and genetic resources at the domestic level. In doing so, I 
equate the dialogue about “whiteness” in American society with the 
dialogue about “colonialism” at a global level. Importantly, both 
dialogues are about politics, power, and property in the sense of 
“ownership” claims to valuable and scarce resources. For indigenous 
peoples, these areas have always overlapped, and they continue to 
coalesce in important ways in both the national and international 
discourses about rights. 
II. “INDIGENEITY” AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
International human rights law increasingly has become a focal 
point for indigenous peoples’ claims for political and cultural rights 
within the nation states that colonized them. The leading scholar on 
international indigenous rights, S. James Anaya, has advocated 
building a human rights framework for indigenous rights founded on 
the idea that “self-determination” constitutes a “universe of human 
rights precepts concerned broadly with peoples, including indigenous 
peoples, and grounded in the idea that all are equally entitled to 
control their own destinies.”45 Of course, the concept of self-
determination has done a great deal of work in the decolonization era 
to dismantle unjust colonial orders and reconstruct nations that were 
involuntarily colonized.  
Not surprisingly, there have been vehement challenges to the 
effort to recognize indigenous groups as “peoples” entitled to a right 
of self-determination. Article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights guarantees that all “peoples” have a political right to self-
determination.46 However, under Article 27 of the same instrument, 
 44. Id.  
 45. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (2004). 
 46. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 
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minority, ethnic and religious groups have a different sort of right, a 
cultural right to freely practice their own customs and religions 
within the pluralistic nation’s society.47 Do “indigenous” groups 
constitute “peoples” or are they merely “ethnic groups”? It appears to 
matter a great deal for purposes of the rights claim. If indigenous 
peoples have a true “political” right to self-determination, then they 
have a full range of rights to governmental autonomy and a territorial 
base for that autonomy that arguably would justify remedial actions 
to correct present injustice, including, in particular cases, a right to 
secession from the nation-state. If they merely have “cultural rights” 
as ethnic groups, then they would seem to have only have a more 
limited right to “self-government” within the larger framework of the 
nation-state, including the right to freely practice their religions and 
customs and speak their languages. The “political/cultural” rights 
distinction within contemporary international human rights law is 
almost reminiscent of the old “political/social” rights distinction 
made in the years of Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine.48 If 
indigenous peoples are recognized as “peoples,” but not recognized 
as having a full right of self-determination, does that ensure their 
equality with other “peoples”? Does it ensure their equality with 
other individual “citizens” of the nation-state? It is almost ironic that 
the European “discoverers” set up a sixteenth-century tribunal to 
adjudicate whether Native peoples were “people” at all for purposes 
of European expansion into the New World (e.g., could they be 
granted the “status of legitimate humans in the eyes of the church and 
state”),49 while today the issue is whether they have a political 
identity that is coequal with the other “peoples” in the world.50 The 
terms might change, but the hierarchies of privilege continue. 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 27, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 48. 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896). 
 49. SHARON HELEN VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTS: EVOLVING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 7 (1998). 
 50. For a very interesting discussion of the 1550 Council of the Indies that met to debate 
this issue, as well as the implications of the debate for indigenous peoples within modern 
human rights law, see id. at 6–8. 
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Of course, none of this has yet been decided. The draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has been winding its 
way through various subcommittees and working groups for several 
years, and has not even begun the formal process that would result in 
an international convention on the subject.51 However, even at these 
initial stages of formulation, there has been an active debate among 
the members of the United Nations as to whether indigenous peoples 
are, in fact, “peoples” and whether they should be recognized as 
having a right to “self-determination.”52 The draft Declaration 
currently asserts that indigenous peoples have a right to self-
determination,53 which is in direct contrast to the previous human 
rights instruments on indigenous rights: ILO 107 (which maintained 
an assimilationist posture designed to ensure equality and 
nondiscrimination for citizens who are members of indigenous 
“populations”)54 and ILO 169 (which does refer to “indigenous 
peoples,” but is careful to note that the use of the term “peoples” is 
not coextensive with the use of the term in other human rights 
documents, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).55 
In the end, this entire discussion may not revolve around the 
terminology of “peoples” at all, but rather the issue of whether 
“indigenous” status is even a category that merits global recognition. 
What are “indigenous” peoples? Should we draft an instrument to 
ensure a basic threshold of rights for those “peoples” that we 
categorize as “indigenous”? Are “American Indian,” “Alaska Native” 
or “Native Hawaiian” peoples “indigenous”? How about the 
multitude of groups in Africa, Asia, and Latin America who claim 
“indigenous” status? Many of these groups have very little in 
common with “federally recognized” tribes in the United States. So, 
how could they all share a uniform identity? Importantly, the draft 
 51. Draft Declaration, supra note 21. 
 52. See VENNE, supra note 49, at 68–96. 
 53. Draft Declaration, supra note 21, art. III. 
 54. The International Labor Organization Convention (No. 107) Concerning the 
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in 
Independent Countries, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (June 2, 1957). 
 55. The International Labor Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, I.L.O., 76th Sess., reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1382 
(1989). 
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Declaration does not contain a definition of “indigenous peoples,” 
which makes one wonder whether it is even a meaningful category 
for legal purposes. 
Scholarship in this area is turning from a focus on the meaning of 
“peoples” to a discussion over whether “indigenous” is a meaningful 
category to assign rights. For example, Patrick Thornberry suggests 
that there is a complex “web of ethical, political and epistemological 
considerations justifying the use of ‘indigenous’, and its 
contestation.”56 In particular, Thornberry draws on the legal dispute 
between scientists and five Native Nations from the Pacific 
Northwest over the remains of “Kennewick Man,” a skeleton 
believed to be approximately 8500 years old, to suggest that there are 
at least “four interwoven strands in ‘indigenous.’”57 The first inquiry 
relates to the association of a people “with a particular place . . . a 
locality, a region, a country, a State.”58 In this inquiry, “place” is of 
utmost importance, because it suggests the link of a people with an 
ancestral territory, as compared with “persons that are native 
generally to the region.”59 The territorial connection implies “land 
rights” that are distinctive from those of other inhabitants of the 
region.60 
The second sense of “indigenous” is that it is “synonymous with 
prior habitation—‘we were here before you, so we are indigenous.’”61 
Thornberry suggests that it is this “priority” claim that gives 
“indigenous” groups their “unique status.”62 If priority can be 
established, then the group is “indigenous.” If priority cannot be 
established, then “indigenous is meaningless.”63 The term then 
applies to “everyone and no one.”64 Thornberry asserts that many 
Asian states are inclined to assert that priority cannot be established 
in those states in the same way as in America, where Europeans 
 56. THORNBERRY, supra note 22, at 35. 
 57. Id. at 37. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
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clearly attempted to “discover” and “colonize” lands that were 
already inhabited by distinctive groups.65  
The third sense in which the term is used designates the status of 
some groups as the “original or first inhabitants.”66 Not only are these 
groups “prior” in a historical sense, but they also assert that they are 
the “first human beings to inhabit a territory.”67 Under such a claim, 
“origin” refers to “a point in time from which we trace subsequent 
developments.”68 Although a claim to first occupancy would enjoy 
heightened moral and legal relevance, Thornberry asserts that “very 
few groups could claim such originality in this sense.”69 
In Thornberry’s view, the “fourth strand accounts for indigenous 
peoples as distinctive societies.”70 This claim deals not with history 
or place, but concerns the nature of indigenous groups as “whole 
societies exhibiting cultural patterns which differ from those of the 
dominant society.”71 Although nineteenth-century jurists drew on 
indigenous peoples’ cultural differences as justification for refusing 
to accord them the political and territorial rights that would accrue to 
“civilized nations,” current human rights law construes cultural 
difference as a category requiring recognition through special 
“cultural rights” for non-dominant groups. Importantly, however, 
both uses of difference subordinate the political status of indigenous 
groups.  
It is apparent that each of these strands of “indigeneity” is 
incomplete to assert the full range of rights claimed by indigenous 
peoples. Yet, it becomes incumbent upon the indigenous groups 
themselves to articulate those rights within the framework provided, 
which is itself limited by the categories and hierarchies that sustain 
privilege. Thornberry summarizes the various international human 
rights instruments that refer to indigenous groups and the 
recommendations of Special Rapporteurs and UN focus groups, 
concluding that there are a range of claimants to indigenous status 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 39. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 71. Id. 
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and that it is difficult to reconcile the fundamental nature of the 
claim, although some have tried to do so by using terms such as 
“populations,” “tribal groups,” “minority groups,” “colonized 
groups,” and “vulnerable populations,” all of which suffer problems 
of inconsistency and incompleteness.72 What is obvious, Thornberry 
concludes, is that “[t]he question of who is indigenous is mired in 
politics, suffused with ethical considerations and questions centering 
around the justifications for a new focus in human rights instruments 
and a specifically addressed body of rights.”73 In other words, by 
examining the politics of the claim asserted, we can see what 
justifications are driving a willingness, or a refusal, to recognize a 
claim for “indigenous” status. By exploring the foundations of 
privilege, we can understand more about how and when a claim for 
indigenous status will be recognized. With that in mind, I will turn to 
three of the most contentious substantive areas for indigenous 
peoples’ rights claims: land, human remains, and genetic resources. 
III. “INDIGENEITY” AND LAND RIGHTS 
The issue of land rights has always been the primary area of 
contested claims between Native peoples and the United States 
government. This issue is replicated at a global level, and in those 
countries subject to colonization by the British Crown, the legal 
framework shares amazing similarity. In the United States, Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia, the Native peoples have been subjected 
to the “Discovery Doctrine,” which essentially holds that, upon 
discovery and settlement, the British Crown was entitled to maintain 
“sovereignty” and claim the lands to the exclusion of any other 
colonial sovereign.74 In all countries except Australia, this meant that 
the Native peoples were recognized as having certain rights to occupy 
their traditional lands until they ceded that right to the Crown.75 The 
concept of Native “aboriginal title” took hold in Canada, the United 
States, and New Zealand, and was ultimately extended to Australia in 
 72. Id. at 40–52. 
 73. Id. at 60. 
 74. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 75. See ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG & REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1553 (4th ed. 2003). 
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1992 with the path-breaking Mabo v. Queensland76 decision out of 
the High Court of Australia. Under this legal concept, the British 
Crown and its successors in title were recognized as having the 
“preemptive” right over the land.77 According to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s decision in Johnson v. McIntosh,78 this meant that the 
Europeans held the full title to the land, except for the Native 
peoples’ “right of occupancy,”79 which could be acquired from them 
“by purchase or conquest.”80 
In the United States, claims for loss of aboriginal title have been 
treated as compensable by federal statute—primarily the Indian 
Claims Commission Act (ICCA)81—and not out of any Constitutional 
duty.82 The ICCA sought to extinguish all aboriginal title claims with 
finality, resulting in monetary compensation to successful groups for 
lands taken unjustly.83 In the United States, most aboriginal title 
claims have been settled, although some are still in the Claims 
process due to procedural irregularities which necessitated further 
Congressional attention, such as the claim of the Alabama-Coushatta 
Tribe of Texas.84 In Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, however, 
Native title claims are receiving a great deal of attention. In the 
western provinces of Canada, such as British Columbia, substantial 
claims have been made by Native groups and attempts are underway 
to reach settlement agreements.85 In Australia, national legislation 
was passed after the Mabo v. Queensland case to elucidate the legal 
standard for Native claimants, which requires the Native peoples to 
 76. [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
 77. See id. 
 78. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 79. Id. at 562. 
 80. Id. at 545. 
 81. Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70–70v (1946) (repealed 1978). 
 82. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 283–85 (1955) (holding that 
Native aboriginal title is not a property interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment 
requirement that government takings of property must be compensated). See generally Nell 
Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 
1215 (1980). 
 83. See §§ 70–70v; Sandra C. Danforth, Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims 
Commission, 49 N.D. L. REV. 359 (1973).  
 84. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe v. United States, 2000 WL 1013532 (Fed. Cl. June 19, 
2000). 
 85. See JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 
77–110 (2002) (discussing aboriginal title claims in British Columbia). 
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maintain a continuing connection to traditional lands and a 
continuing framework of traditional law governing their claims to 
these lands.86 In New Zealand, much of the Maori peoples’ land was 
taken through unjust acquisitions in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, but the Waitangi Tribunal is charged with 
interpreting the Treaty of Waitangi to redress this history of 
injustice.87 Maori claims to continuing aboriginal title to fish, water, 
and other natural resources have been recognized, as well as their 
continuing “customary law” rights over the management of 
traditional lands and resources.88 Thus, it seems to be merely a matter 
of time before territorial and land rights are addressed through 
comprehensive legislation. 
In short, Native land rights and associated resource rights are very 
much alive and part of the international rights discourse. Not 
surprisingly, this issue has drawn the attention of a noted legal 
philosopher from New Zealand, Jeremy Waldron, who is best known 
for his work on property rights and for his critiques of “group rights” 
within contemporary liberal discourse.89 Waldron’s latest essay, 
Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy,90 is a philosophical 
critique of the term “indigenous,” which essentially asks why the 
term should justify a particular set of rights that is distinct from those 
of anyone else.91 In other words, what is special about “indigeneity”?  
According to Waldron, there are two possible ways of defining 
“indigeneity”: 
(1) Indigenous peoples are the descendants of the first human 
inhabitants of a land (the “first occupancy” argument), or 
 86. Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.), discussed in MCRAE ET AL., INDIGENOUS LEGAL 
ISSUES 229–32 (1997). 
 87. See P.G. McHugh, The Constitutional Role of the Waitangi Tribunal, 1985 N.Z. L.J. 
224 (1985). 
 88. See generally Michael A. Burnett, The Dilemma of Commercial Fishing Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: A Comparative Study of the Common Law Nations, 19 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 389 (1996). 
 89. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); Jeremy 
Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 
(1992). 
 90. Jeremy Waldron, Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy, 1 N.Z. J. PUB. & 
INT’L L. 55 (2003). 
 91. Id. at 57. 
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(2) Indigenous peoples are the descendants of those who inhabited 
the land at the time of European colonization (“prior occupancy” 
argument).92 
In some case (for example, New Zealand), the two categories 
might overlap. In other cases, they clearly would not. Waldron’s 
essay directly confronts the “politics and philosophy of cultural rights 
and the rights of First Peoples.”93 He claims that the concept of 
“indigeneity” privileges some groups over others, prompting the view 
in New Zealand that “what is plainly a multicultural reality in this 
country should be described, at least for certain legal and political 
purposes, as bi-cultural.”94 This obviously impacts the legal structure 
that is created to achieve justice between disparate cultural groups in 
a pluralistic society. For example, in the United States, Waldron’s 
argument might inspire the question whether the claims for “justice” 
by the descendants of African slaves or the descendants of the 
Mexican people whose lands were taken unjustly after the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo annexed their lands into the United States, are 
different (equal to, less than, greater than) the claims of Native 
peoples. 
In New Zealand, Waldron argues, the Treaty of Waitangi “has 
been given a status in our constitution that is plainly superior to the 
status accorded to other treaties that the Crown has entered into.”95 
Waldron asks why this should be so. Moreover, he claims, this 
phenomenon is not unique to New Zealand.96 He claims that because 
indigenous groups are perceived to have a “special attachment to 
their lands,” they are making a claim for a priority of rights.97 Thus, 
in order to assess what is important about “indigeneity,” one must ask 
what principles or legal or political ideas are evoked by the concept. 
For purposes of Waldron’s article, this inspires an inquiry into (1) the 
principles that underlie land rights and (2) the contemporary 
perspective that distributive justice demands a readjustment of 
resources if land, wealth, income, and power are wrongly distributed 
 92. Id. at 55. 
 93. Id. at 57. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 58. 
 96. Id. at 66. 
 97. Id.  
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in contemporary society. In the case of indigenous peoples, Waldron 
asserts, this is commonly understood as a need to “restore land rights 
and sovereignty rights that were once held by their ancestors.”98 
Waldron draws an explicit connection between domestic claims by 
the Maori for land rights and the international law concept of 
“reversion,” which is based on the “continuity of de jure sovereignty, 
even under adverse conditions like colonization.”99 Under this 
doctrine, the “right of an ousted sovereign to have sovereignty 
restored under the laws governing belligerent occupation is derived 
from ultimate de jure title or territorial sovereignty.”100 Thus, the 
doctrine perceives that sovereignty does not inure in the belligerent 
occupant, but rather continues in the dispossessed peoples until it can 
be restored. Waldron’s response to this argument, within the context 
of indigenous rights, evokes the connection between “whiteness” and 
colonialism. 
Waldron’s central premise in the article is that indigenous rights 
advocates have used concepts of “first occupancy” and “prior 
occupancy” in an opportunist and self-serving manner that ignores 
the real character of these concepts as “moral principles.”101 
Waldron’s entire essay is devoted to proving that the rights claims by 
indigenous peoples lack any credible moral basis for a claim to 
“priority” and that they are virtually indistinguishable from the 
claims of any other aggrieved member of a “multicultural” society. 
Waldron claims, for example, that for purposes of the “First 
Occupancy” argument, indigenous peoples are grounding their claims 
to their assertion that they were the “first inhabitants” of their 
traditional lands and that they have occupied these lands “since the 
dawn of time.”102 In fact, the first occupancy argument is made by 
scholars such as James Anaya, in support of Native land rights, and it 
is also embedded in the idea of “aboriginal title.”103 Waldron claims 
that the moral notion at play here is that the first person or 
community to take possession of a resource or piece of land is 
 98. Id. at 61. 
 99. Id. at 66. 
 100. Id. at 67. 
 101. Id. at 79. 
 102. Id. at 71. 
 103. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 45, at 105. 
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entitled to claim “ownership.”104 The entitlement is purely based on 
priority, since there is no conflicting claim to title. There can be 
successors to title because “first occupancy is not supposed to be 
inalienable,” but such a transfer must be voluntary and based on 
consent.”105 
Waldron finds at least two significant problems with this theory in 
relation to justifications for contemporary land rights. First, as a 
factual matter, it is necessary to prove that the group was in fact the 
first possessor of land since “time immemorial,” which may be very 
difficult to do.106 Waldron demonstrates, for example, that this would 
be very difficult in a country like India with the long history of 
various groups claiming the same lands.107 Secondly, Waldron 
claims, it is necessary to ensure that the claimant did not gain title 
through warfare with other indigenous people.108 Waldron is quite 
skeptical of Maori claims because of his perception that they 
historically considered themselves distinct tribes and peoples and that 
they were often at war with one another.109 If land title was 
established by “war and violence,” then first occupancy has no moral 
force. Nor does Waldron accept the claim that intertribal warfare can 
be distinguished as “culturally consensual,” while “colonialism” is 
characterized as “conquest” purely by virtue of cultural difference.110 
According to Waldron, this type of argument merely “avoids the 
issue, which is whether there was an original peaceful acquisition of 
title, or not.”111  
In comparison, Waldron associates the “prior occupancy” 
argument with the assertion that indigenous people have title because 
they were the occupants at the time of European contact and therefore 
 104. Waldron, supra note 90, at 68–69. 
 105. Id. at 68. 
 106. The “time immemorial” standard is used in the United States to adjudicate aboriginal 
title cases. See, e.g., United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 359 (1941). Not 
surprisingly, this contested notion of “first occupancy” also links up to current archaeological 
and genetic research on the origins of human populations.  
 107. Waldron, supra note 90, at 63. 
 108. Id. at 72. 
 109. Id. at 72, 76. 
 110. Id. at 77. 
 111. Id. 
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this title should have been acknowledged.112 He claims that this is the 
dominant approach used in international human rights law to justify 
recognition for indigenous land rights.113 According to Waldron, the 
problem with this argument relates to whether the wrongful 
occupation has gone on for a short time or a long time.114 If it has 
only been a “short time,” then reversion may be an appropriate 
remedy to ensure justice.115 If it has gone on for a long period of time, 
then Waldron identifies two potentially insurmountable challenges. 
First, the principle of prior occupancy derives its moral strength 
from the “human interest in stability, security, certainty, and 
peace.”116 Because those are the operative values, it would be morally 
unconscionable to overturn existing arrangements—irrespective of 
how they were arrived at—if the act of restoration would violate 
these values.117 In other words, the principle of prior occupancy is 
concerned with preventing injustice by honoring a particular set of 
values. The principle was operative at the moment of colonization 
(even if disregarded by the colonizers), but it is equally operative at 
the present moment.  
Secondly, Waldron maintains that if the occupation of the 
colonists has continued for several generations, then the current 
possessors have strong expectation interests which would be violated 
by a sudden change.118 Waldron claims that he is not suggesting that 
“an initially unjust regime may acquire a title to respect because of 
the mere passage of time.”119 Time cannot wash away crimes, but the 
“passage of time can establish patterns of expectation.”120 The 
analogy here is to the principle of prescription within Anglo-
American property law, which blocks claims founded in the distant 
past in order to honor certainty and security of title.121 The trick, of 
 112. Id. at 71. 
 113. Id. at 65. 
 114. Id. at 74. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 73. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 73–74. 
 119. Id. at 74. 
 120. Id.  
 121. See New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 786 (1998) (“The doctrine of prescription 
and acquiescence ‘is founded upon the supposition, confirmed by constant experience, that 
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course, is to distinguish when courts are operating according to 
Waldron’s first point (saying that an original illegal act can be 
“cured” by the passage of time) and when they are honoring the latter 
point (saying that rewarding expectation interests built up over time 
is an honorable means to justify a shift in title). A good case in point 
is Vermont v. Elliott,122 in which a state court refused to recognize an 
indigenous group’s assertion of rights deriving from un-extinguished 
aboriginal title based in part on its finding that the Abenaki’s claim 
had been extinguished “by the increasing weight of history.”123 
In short, Waldron finds that indigenous peoples’ claims are not 
“self-justifying.”124 He asserts that the moral principles of “first 
occupancy” and “prior occupancy,” derived from natural law, may 
support or undercut indigenous claims, and this should be 
acknowledged honestly.125 Waldron is offended by the “mystical” 
quality associated with indigenous claims, which assumes that there 
is a “timeless and sacred quality” to indigenous occupation, which is 
not ascribed to any other group merely claiming “prior” 
occupation.126 Furthermore, Waldron worries about the consequences 
of effecting a massive redistribution of rights and resources by 
drawing lines between “indigenous” people and “nonindigenous” 
people, which further requires one to identify the status of 
“immigrants,” when all are supposedly “equal citizens” of a 
pluralistic society.127 This argument is quite similar to that advocated 
by jurists committed to the notion that we are a color-blind society. In 
every person will naturally seek to enjoy that which belongs to him; and the inference fairly to 
be drawn from his silence and neglect, of the original defect of his title, or his intention to 
relinquish it.”). 
 122. 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992). 
 123. Id. at 218. For an excellent critique of this case, see Joseph Singer, Well-Settled?: The 
Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481 (1994).  
 124. Waldron, supra note 90, at 81. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 82. In this sense, Waldron’s critique foreshadows the attack on Native claims to 
protect “sacred sites.” Such claims relate to the spiritual qualities of land within Native world 
views, but they are commonly dismissed as claims for “religious rights” that are not 
constitutionally justifiable. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 
U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that Free Exercise Clause is not violated by federal government’s plan 
to construct a road through a portion of national forest traditionally used by several tribes for 
religious purposes even though this would preclude tribes from effectively practicing their 
religions).  
 127. Waldron, supra note 90, at 80. 
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other words, the differences between citizens are not meaningful, and 
are potentially dangerous, because they draw divisions that upset the 
norm of “formal equality,” and therefore threaten to destabilize the 
entire society. 
Waldron’s article builds on his previous work, which examines 
the assertion of indigenous groups that they have special rights to 
land (and that “reparations” should be made for “past injustice”),128 
as well as his work criticizing the claims of particular groups for 
“special” cultural rights that are distinctive from those accorded to 
any other group.129 This body of work illustrates the important 
connections between domestic and international law for indigenous 
peoples, the way these bodies of law are influenced by liberal theory, 
and the assumptions that are made by many liberal theorists about the 
nature of rights and their derivations. This work raises a number of 
problematic considerations. Is it true that the label “indigenous” adds 
nothing to a claim for specific land rights? We live in a world where 
Native peoples’ land rights have always been treated separately from 
those of non-Native people, as nations or as individuals. The category 
of “aboriginal title,” for example, is a purely Western innovation 
applied to Native peoples subjected to European colonization.130 
Moreover, as the Navajo-Hopi land dispute demonstrated, intra-tribal 
land disputes are not treated the same under American law. In that 
dispute, the Hopi tribe’s claim for rights based on “first occupancy” 
was awarded by the actual return of land and concomitant removal of 
Navajo families who had lived on the land for generations.131 In 
comparison, involuntary removal and relocation have never resulted 
from a land settlement between Native and non-Native peoples. In 
those cases, the Native Americans have received federal or state 
lands, not subject to individual claims of title, as well as monetary 
 128. See Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992). 
 129. Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, in THE RIGHTS 
OF MINORITY CULTURES 93, 93–114 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). 
 130. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), was the first case to articulate the legal 
notion of an “indigenous right to occupancy,” which led to the notion of “aboriginal title.”  
 131. See The Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712 
(1974) (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. § 640d). The Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act set 
up the system for dividing the land and removing families under a complex federal bureaucracy. 
The dispute continues today, and certain Navajo families have refused to relocate and have 
gone so far as to claim an abridgment of their international human rights. 
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judgments for their extinguished title.132 Individual non-Indian 
landowners have been secured in the title to their lands, and the only 
transfers to date have been voluntary and fully compensated. 
It is possible that “indigenous” land rights cannot be appropriately 
understood within Western liberal theory. If Western categories of 
human rights and property rights depend on the moral framework 
described by Waldron, then intercultural views of the appropriate 
ethical and normative principles to consider “rights” may never be 
acknowledged. So, how can indigenous people justify their claims for 
land and other important resources? The next part of this essay, 
which deals with Native claims to ancestral human remains, further 
illustrates the complexity of these issues. 
IV. “INDIGENEITY” AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: THE KENNEWICK CASE 
The most overt challenge to the notion of “indigeneity” in recent 
American jurisprudence has emerged from the debate over a group of 
scientists and five Native Nations from the Pacific Northwest who 
claimed an ancient set of human remains in Washington (dubbed 
“Kennewick Man” by the news media) as their common ancestor.133 
The case arose in July 1996, when a group of spectators attending a 
boat race discovered human skeletal remains on the shore of the 
Columbia River, just outside of Kennewick Washington.134 A local 
anthropologist, James Chatters, secured an Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act permit to remove the remains, and his initial testing of 
the remains indicated that the remains were between 8000 and 9000 
years old.135 Because of the asserted age of the remains and 
Chatters’s observation that they were more “Caucasoid” in 
appearance than “Native American,” the skeleton attracted the 
 132. See, e.g., Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721–35 (2000) 
(settling the claims of the Passamaquoddy tribe, Penobscot Nation, and the Houlton Band of 
Maliseet Indians for unextinguished aboriginal title and violations of the federal Nonintercourse 
Acts). 
 133. Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Or. 2002). For a factual 
background on the case, as well as an analysis of the district court’s initial decisions, see 
Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary 
Cultural Values, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583 (1999). 
 134. Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.  
 135. Id.  
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attention of several scientists, including Douglas Owsley of the 
Smithsonian Institution, who sought to remove the remains for 
further study.136 Four Indian tribes opposed that plan and filed a claim 
under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(NAGPRA).137 NAGPRA provides that the ownership of Native 
American human remains excavated on federal lands after the 
effective date of the statute belongs to tribes who can show cultural 
affiliation to the remains, or, alternatively, a sufficiently strong 
cultural relationship to the remains based, for example, on their 
aboriginal ownership of the lands where the remains were found.138 A 
fifth tribe later joined the group, agreeing with the other tribal 
claimants that this set of remains was their common ancestor. The 
Army Corps of Engineers accepted the assertion and prepared a 
Notice of Intent to Repatriate Human Remains, pursuant to 
NAGPRA’s requirement.139 This decision became the subject of a 
legal action by a group of scientists who sought to enjoin the 
repatriation on the grounds that the Army Corps did not have 
sufficient evidence of cultural affiliation, and that the cultural 
affiliation of this skeleton was provable only by scientific testing.140 
The scientists also asserted that they had a legal right to study the 
remains and that the application of NAGPRA in this case was 
unconstitutional.141 
After a very complicated set of procedural wranglings, the 
Secretary of the Interior conducted a full evidentiary analysis of the 
cultural affiliation issue and made a final decision that the skeleton 
was culturally affiliated to the joint claimants by a “preponderance of 
the evidence.”142 The Secretary further determined that, in the 
alternative, “a claim based on aboriginal occupation . . . is also a 
basis for the disposition of the Kennewick remains to the claimant 
 136. Id. at 1121. 
 137. Id.; Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1170, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 (2000). 
 138. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2004). 
 139. Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1121–22. 
 140. Id. at 1122. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1130 (internal citations omitted). 
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Indian tribes.”143 The plaintiff scientists appealed the decision to the 
district court, which ruled in their favor, asserting that the Secretary 
erred in finding that the Kennewick remains were “Native American” 
within the meaning of NAGPRA144 and had also erred in finding that 
aboriginal title was an alternative basis for the claim because none of 
the tribes possessed a final judgment from the Indian Claims 
Commission confirming title to the site.145 In fact, the lands were 
within the original claim area of the Colville tribe’s aboriginal title 
action, but the tribe’s subsequent settlement agreement placed the site 
outside of the final judgment area by less than one mile.146 The 
federal defendants appealed the district court’s decision, and the 
tribal claimants intervened in that appeal. 
The Ninth Circuit issued its opinion on February 4, 2004.147 The 
court upheld the district court’s opinion, but used a slightly different 
analysis. Importantly, the opinion is devoid of any assumption that 
“Native Americans” were the “first” to occupy the lands of North 
America. The court describes Kennewick Man not by his race, 
ethnicity, or culture, but rather as “one of the most important 
American anthropological and archaeological discoveries of the late 
twentieth century.”148 He is a scientific discovery and not a real 
person. Moreover, according to the court, this case is not about 
Native rights to ancestral remains, but rather it is about who owns: 
The ancient human remains of a man who hunted and lived, or 
at least journeyed, in the Columbia Plateau an estimated 8340 
to 9200 years ago, a time predating all recorded history from 
any place in the world, a time before the oldest cities of our 
world had been founded, a time so ancient that the pristine and 
untouched land and the primitive cultures that may have lived 
on it are not deeply understood by even the most well-
informed men and women of our age.149 
 143. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 144. Id. at 1139. 
 145. Id. at 1160. 
 146. Id. at 1158. 
 147. Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 148. Id. at 966. 
 149. Id.  
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The circuit court’s opinion holds that “Kennewick Man’s remains 
are not Native American human remains within the meaning of 
NAGPRA and that NAGPRA does not apply to them.”150 The court 
finds that there was insufficient evidence that Kennewick Man was 
“Native American” because the evidentiary record would “not permit 
the Secretary to conclude reasonably that Kennewick Man shares 
special and significant genetic or cultural features with presently 
existing indigenous tribes, people, or cultures.”151 Because 
Kennewick Man was not “Native American,” the Secretary’s 
alternative ground, based on aboriginal title, was unavailable as a 
means of proving tribal ownership of the remains. Furthermore, 
because Kennewick Man was not “Native American,” the remains 
were “federal property” available for study by the plaintiff scientists 
under ARPA.152 According to the court, Native people have no claim 
to ownership of a set of remains that predates historic European 
colonization of the New World; rather, the federal government is the 
“owner” of these human remains.153 Thus, the Native people have no 
cultural right to access the remains or require any limitations on the 
study, but the scientists have a full right to study the remains, even if 
this would require destructive analysis that is completely antagonistic 
to Native beliefs about appropriate treatment of human remains. 
How could this be? Why is an “indigenous” set of remains not 
“indigenous”? Or is it the Native American people themselves who 
are not “indigenous”? The key to this opinion is the court’s finding 
that Congress had already determined this issue in the statute, and its 
concomitant refusal to recognize that the Secretary had any authority 
to interpret the term “Native American” to include ancient sets of 
human remains. 
In fact, NAGPRA defines human remains as “Native American” if 
they are “of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is 
indigenous to the United States.”154 Through notice and comment 
rulemaking, the Secretary generated a regulation defining “Native 
 150. Id. at 979. 
 151. Id. 
 152. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm (2000); Bonnichsen, 357 F.3d at 979. 
 153. Bonnichsen, 357 F.3d at 979.  
 154. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (2000). 
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American” to mean “of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture 
indigenous to the United States.”155 Under the Secretary’s definition, 
all graves and remains found in the United States that predate 
European settlement would be “indigenous” to the United States and 
subject to NAGPRA. The remains would be “Native American” for 
purposes of NAGPRA, although they may in fact not be able to be 
“culturally affiliated” to a specific contemporary tribe. In this case, 
the statute reserves a category for “culturally unidentifiable” Native 
American human remains, and another category for Native American 
remains that are “unclaimed” for any reason. 
The court of appeals reinterpreted NAGPRA, asserting that 
Congress intentionally used the present tense language (“that is” 
indigenous)156 to restrict the statute’s coverage only to human 
remains that “bear some relationship to a presently existing tribe, 
people, or culture to be considered ‘Native American.’”157 Although 
there is no specific reference to such an intent in the statute itself or 
its legislative history, the court draws on the “ordinary meaning” of 
the word “indigenous” as well as grammatical rules about when to 
use the present tense, alongside Congressional intent to respect the 
burial traditions of modern-day American Indians.158 Ultimately, the 
court concludes that Congress never intended to preclude the 
“exhumation, study, and display of ancient human remains that are 
unrelated to modern American Indians,”159 since, by definition, 
modern tribes would have no interest in such remains.160 
The court’s interpretation of NAGPRA creates two significant 
obstacles for Native Nations seeking to claim control over ancestral 
human remains. First, the opinion increases the tribe’s burden of 
proof for asserting cultural affiliation to a set of remains.161 
NAGPRA’s standard for proving “cultural affiliation” is already quite 
onerous, although it permits the tribe to demonstrate cultural 
affiliation through a variety of means, including historical, 
 155. 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d) (2005). 
 156. Bonnichsen, 357 F.3d at 973. 
 157. Id. at 976 
 158. Id. at 973. 
 159. Id. at 974. 
 160. Id. at 976–77. 
 161. Id. at 973 (construing the language in NAGPRA). 
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anthropological, or cultural proof, including oral histories and oral 
traditions.162 NAGPRA specifies that all of these categories of 
evidence are to be given equal weight and that, in no case, should 
tribes be held to prove cultural affiliation with “scientific” 
certainty.163 This opinion requires a second (and prior) step for tribes. 
Before they ever get to the issue of cultural affiliation, they must 
demonstrate that they have a “special and significant genetic or 
cultural relationship” to the remains, which justifies a finding that the 
remains are “Native American.”164 Importantly, however, the court 
finds that oral traditions and histories did not provide sufficient 
evidence, and that without some further corroboration through 
“documented” or “scientific” evidence, the tribes will fail at this 
initial step.165 
The second problem is the court’s confusing analysis, which 
distinguishes the term “indigenous” from the term “Native 
American.”166 The court acknowledges that there were peoples in 
North America prior to European settlement, and that these may be 
referred to as “indigenous” peoples.167 However, the court finds that 
NAGPRA applies only to “Native American” remains, which 
essentially requires the remains to be tied to “indigenous peoples” 
that presently exist as an “indigenous tribe, people, or culture.”168 
Thus, not only do contemporary “American Indian” peoples have 
control only over the remains of their “genetic and cultural 
forbearers” and not “over the remains of people bearing no special 
and significant genetic or cultural relationship to some presently 
existing indigenous tribe, people, or culture,” but “human remains 
that are 8340 to 9200 years old and that bear only incidental genetic 
resemblance to other peoples” cannot be described as “Native 
American” at all!169 Using Waldron’s terminology, this decision 
indicates that, to the extent that the claims of indigenous peoples are 
 162. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (2000). 
 163. Id.; see also 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(f) (2005). 
 164. Bonnichsen, 357 F.3d at 977. 
 165. Id. at 979. 
 166. Id. at 974–76. 
 167. Id. at 975. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. at 977. 
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founded on their status as “prior occupants,” this does not justify any 
finding of special rights unless they can also demonstrate that they 
are the “original” occupants of the lands, and possibly that they have 
been the “exclusive” occupants from the “beginning” of time to the 
present. Moreover, they must not use “cultural” evidence as a form of 
proof, but they must prove this status with scientific certainty. In the 
context of claims for ancestral human remains, this appears to require 
a genetic match, since the “culture” of a deceased individual would 
be difficult to ascertain from a set of remains that had washed into a 
river and lacked the context that might be found within a burial site. 
Finally, the court’s opinion contains the dimly articulated, yet 
troubling, assumption that the remains may not be “Native 
American” at all because they were initially described as being more 
“European” than “Native American.”170 The court explains that the 
subsequent study of Kennewick Man’s morphology revealed that his 
features “most closely resembled those of Polynesians and southern 
Asians” and did not resemble those of any “modern Indian group 
living in North America.”171 In other words, the reason that 
Kennewick Man is the most important scientific discovery of this 
century is because of his capacity to “prove” who, in fact, were the 
“first Americans.” The identity of the “first Americans” is part of a 
larger inquiry into the origins of human populations and is therefore 
an important subject for contemporary geneticists, as the next section 
of this essay demonstrates. 
V. INDIGENEITY AND RIGHTS TO GENETIC RESOURCES 
Current research dealing with population genomics and the origins 
of human populations raises several challenges to Native American 
identity based on a blend of scientific and legal attacks. This research 
places a heightened emphasis upon “genetic identity” in accordance 
with contemporary scientific analysis, but in reality, this research 
constitutes a twenty-first century manifestation of a very old 
phenomenon in American social politics: the construction of race. As 
Cheryl Harris and other scholars have observed, the scientific 
 170. Id. at 978. 
 171. Id. 
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construction of race in the nineteenth-century worked in tandem with 
the law to define the rights of Africans and other “non-white” 
groups.172 Harris documents that these nineteenth-century cases 
“assumed the crucial task of racial classification, and accepted and 
embraced the then-current theories of race as biological fact.”173  
 The law relied on bounded, objective, and scientific 
definitions of race . . . to construct whiteness as not merely 
race, but race plus privilege. By making race determinant and 
the product of rationality and science, dominant and 
subordinate positions within the racial hierarchy were 
disguised as the product of natural law and biology rather than 
as naked preferences. Whiteness as racialized privilege was 
then legitimated by science and was embraced in legal doctrine 
as “objective fact.”174  
Although it is no longer considered “politically correct” to assert 
that there is a biological basis for “race,” the scientific construction of 
race in the twenty-first century continues through efforts to document 
the genetic identity of distinct groups, a process often referred to as 
“population genomics.”175 Much of this research purports to reveal 
the susceptibility of certain “groups,” such as African-Americans or 
Native Americans, to certain diseases, such as sickle cell anemia or 
diabetes.176 Researchers contend that if they can identify the genetic 
basis for such diseases, they can develop treatments which are 
population-specific and have a greater likelihood of success.177 In 
fact, genetic research on Native peoples has been underway for 
decades through Indian Health Science studies on diabetes that have 
required blood samples to be extracted from many individuals and 
 172. See generally Harris, supra note 4. 
 173. Id. at 1737. 
 174. Id. at 1738. 
 175. For an excellent collection of essays dealing with population-based genetic research, 
see Symposium, Legal and Ethical Issues in Genetic Research on Indigenous Populations, 42 
JURIMETRICS 121 (2002), available at http://law.asu.edu/?id=8220. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See Richard P. Sharp & Morris W. Foster, Involving Study Populations in the Review 
of Genetic Research, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 41 (2000). 
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tribal groups. In some of these studies, only individuals who were 
“full blood” members of tribes were invited to participate.178 
This research has come under close scrutiny by Native groups in 
the contemporary era for a variety of reasons. First, many Native 
groups contend that they agreed to research because of the assertion 
that the blood samples taken and data gathered would only be used 
for specific purposes, such as diabetes research.179 Some groups later 
discovered that the samples and data had been used to support 
research on topics that they had not consented to, such as the origin 
of human populations or research on the frequency of mental health 
conditions.180  
Secondly, many Native groups became politically involved in the 
issue of genetic research after the Human Genome Diversity Project 
(HGDP) was announced in the wake of the effort to map the human 
genome. The Human Genome project relied on genetic samples from 
European-derived groups.181 Proponents of the HGDP asserted the 
necessity to gather samples from non-European populations for 
comparative purposes. They claimed a particular interest in data from 
indigenous groups and other “population isolates,” contending that it 
was necessary to preserve this data before these groups lost their 
genetic identity through admixture or their cultural identity through 
assimilation.182 This rationale was highly offensive to Native people, 
in part because of its underlying assumption that they were a 
“vanishing” species of human being, similar to the “Vanishing 
Redman” ideology of the nineteenth century that resulted in troops of 
 178. My colleague at Arizona State University, Dr. Carol Lujan, recalled this from a 
conference that she attended where Native participants were recruited to give blood samples to 
government health officials, but only if they had “pure” Native blood. 
 179. See Juan A. Avila Hernandez, Blood, Lies, and Indian Rights: TCU’s Becoming 
Gatekeepers For Research, 16(2) TRIBAL COLLEGE J. (2004). 
 180. For example, the Havasupai tribe recently filed a complaint against Arizona State 
University and several named defendants that maintains that the researchers exceeded the scope 
of the consent given by the tribe and its members to a medical study on diabetes. The 
Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona State University, No. CV 2004-0146 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 
2004). 
 181. For a full analysis of the Human Genome Project and its larger impact on minority 
communities, see RAYMOND A. ZILINSKAS & PETER J. BALINT, THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 
AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES: ETHICAL, SOCIAL & POLITICAL DILEMMAS (2001). 
 182. See Jenny Reardon, The Human Genome Diversity Project: A Case Study in 
Coproduction, 31(3) SOC. STUD. SCI. 357 (2001). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p  55 Tsosie book pages.doc  10/18/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 18:55 
 
 
 
anthropologists visiting reservations to gather data and remove 
cultural objects before the Indian people “disappeared.”183 
Third, many Native groups became alarmed after the 
announcement that researchers were seeking to obtain patents on 
products derived from Native genetic samples, such as the cell-line of 
a South Pacific group that was initially patented. However, the patent 
was revoked after an official outcry from that group.184 The idea that 
the genetic data of a Native group could be transformed into a 
commercial product and marketed for profit is directly tied to the 
commodification argument that Harris makes.185 
Finally, Native peoples are concerned about the political use that 
is being made of DNA research as a means to “scientifically 
establish” their identity as “indigenous” peoples. Kimberly TallBear, 
for example, associates the contemporary effort to establish “Native 
American identity” through DNA testing as a “sophisticated form of 
eugenics” that is being asserted to “support or deny a person’s or a 
group’s claims to cultural and political rights.”186 TallBear points to 
two contemporary cases where DNA testing has been used or 
suggested for use in order to establish “Native American identity.” 
First, a state Representative from Vermont sponsored a bill, at the 
request of the Western Mohegan tribe, to “establish standards and 
procedures for DNA-HLA testing to determine the identity of an 
individual as a Native American, at the request and expense of the 
 183. The Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism has published several documents 
intended to mobilize Native people to challenge this research and informing them of the 
dangers of genetic research for Native groups. See, e.g., Indigenous Peoples Council on 
Biocolonialism, Key Points for a Resolution Opposing the Human Genome Diversity Project 
and Genetic Research on Indigenous Peoples, available at http://ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/ 
key_points.html (last visited June 22, 2005); Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism, 
Indigenous Peoples, Genes & Genetics: What Indigenous People Should Know About 
Biocolonialism (2000), available at http://ipcb.org/publications/primers/htmls/ipgg.html. 
 184. See generally VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND 
KNOWLEDGE (1997). 
 185. See Harris, supra note 4, at 1719 (noting “the cruel tension between property and 
humanity” inherent in slavery and the commodification of women’s bodies); see also Aroha Te 
Pareake Mead, Geneaology, Sacredness, and the Commodities Market, 20 CULT. SURVIVAL Q. 
46 (1996). 
 186. Kimberly TallBear, Genetics, Culture and Identity in Indian Country (2000) (paper 
presented at Seventh International Congress of Ethnobiology), available at http://iiirm.org/ 
publications/Articles%20Reports%20Papers/Genetics%20and%20Biotechnology/ISEPaper.pdf. 
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individual.”187 The Mohegans’ claimed intent was to “help other 
Indian people,” like themselves, who lacked adequate genealogical 
documentation of their “Indian” identity and thus had difficulty 
gaining federal status.188 The Mohegans had voluntarily submitted 
themselves to DNA testing to “prove” their affiliation to related 
tribes, at least one of which is a federally recognized tribe in 
Wisconsin.189 The legislation drew a heated reaction from other tribes 
in the state that understood the legislative intent to be mandatory 
DNA testing and associated the bill with an act of “genocide.”190 The 
bill was ultimately defeated.191 However, TallBear demonstrates that 
many federally recognized tribes have been approached by private 
companies marketing DNA tests as a means to establish the 
authenticity of enrolled members or those petitioning for 
enrollment.192 Moreover, TallBear points to a number of products 
marketed on the internet which purport to help individuals ascertain 
their ancestry as European, African, Asian, or Native American.193 
These tests appear to be quite appealing to Americans seeking to 
“prove” their “Native American” family lineage, based on family 
stories of a remote “Indian” ancestor rather than any continuing 
cultural or political connection to a particular Native community. 
These scientific methods of documenting ancestry, as TallBear 
points out, are quite problematic for a number of reasons. First, they 
represent a return to the overt racism of nineteenth-century 
lawmakers who believed that an individual’s culture and identity are 
primarily biologically determined rather than socially constructed.194 
As TallBear asserts, scientists and policymakers in support of genetic 
testing to determine “cultural identity” are making an assumption that 
“genetic markers are synonymous with culture and somehow 
guarantee cultural continuity.”195 In fact, however, it is “cultural and 
 187. Id. at 2. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 3. 
 192. Kimberly TallBear, “Native American DNA,” Race, and the Search for Origins in 
Molecular Anthropology 9 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 193. Id. at 10. 
 194. TallBear, supra note 186, at 4.  
 195. Id.  
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political continuity and self-determination [which are] the heart of 
what it is to be a tribe or tribal nation.”196 Secondly, the effort 
perpetuates the continuing assumption that a particular “blood 
quantum” justifies “Native American” status.197 As a result of federal 
policies designed to define a limited group of persons entitled to 
federal benefits, most federally recognized tribes continue to require 
a certain level of blood quantum to qualify for tribal membership. 
This can be as much as 1/2 blood or as little as 1/32 blood.198 Because 
of these disparate requirements, along with the fact that some tribes 
have rejected blood quantum in favor of a “lineal descent” standard 
that permits enrolled members to have a fractional blood quantum 
measured in the hundredths of degrees, there is obviously no uniform 
approach to establish “Indian” identity. In fact, as TallBear notes, the 
blood quantum methodology is a significant departure from the 
practices of most nations and ethnic communities which would assess 
citizenship or membership using a variety of nonracial factors, 
including residence, family relationship, language, and religion.199 
Yet, as Native Nations strive for a more nuanced understanding of 
their political status as autonomous groups with a right of “self-
determination,” they continue to face pressure to prove their identity 
“scientifically,” and they continue to encounter widespread 
assumptions about the “authenticity” of Indian identity as primarily 
correlated to one’s “racial,” rather than “cultural” identity.200 
Genetic testing of individuals to determine “Native American” 
identity shares an interesting intersection with the efforts of scientists 
to extract DNA from ancient skeletal remains to determine their 
“cultural affiliation” and, ultimately, to demonstrate the origins of 
human populations and “who were the first Americans.” Not 
surprisingly, TallBear associates the Kennewick case with the 
Vermont DNA bill to establish contemporary Native identity because 
both types of research seek to prove “cultural affiliation” through the 
 196. Id. at 3. 
 197. Id. at 4. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.; see also Hilary N. Weaver, Indigenous Identity: What Is It, and Who Really Has 
It?, 25 AM. INDIAN Q. 240 (2001) (analyzing the politics of “Indigenous Identity” within the 
context of internalized colonialism).  
 200. TallBear, supra note 186, at 6. 
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use of “genetic markers.”201 In the Kennewick Man case, scientists 
were unable to extract a viable sample of DNA due to the age of the 
remains in the initial set of tests that were approved to demonstrate 
“cultural affiliation.”202 However, now that the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that the remains are not “Native American” for 
purposes of NAGPRA, the scientists have submitted a request to do 
further DNA testing of the remains in connection with a full scientific 
assessment of the remains.203 And what would this assessment show? 
According to Robson Bonnichsen of The Center for the Study of the 
First Americans at Texas A&M University, the forty page study plan 
that has been submitted to the Department of the Interior and Army 
Corps of Engineers (the federal custodians of the remains) represents 
a “state-of-the-art proposal to do the most detailed look at a first 
American that has ever been put together.”204 The Kennewick Man, 
they believe, may hold the key to determining the identity of the 
“first Americans.” 
It appears that the litigation over Kennewick Man has been a way 
to prove (scientifically, of course) that the “first Americans” were not 
the ancestors of contemporary Native American people. In a series of 
articles published in various popular science magazines, there is a 
lively and on-going exchange about the “identity of the first 
Americans.”205 For many years, the prevailing scientific theory about 
the “peopling of America” asserted that the Clovis people were the 
first Americans, and that they were big-game hunters who crossed the 
Bering Land Bridge from Siberia to North America approximately 
12,000 years ago.206 The Clovis people were alleged to have been the 
direct ancestors of present-day American Indians.207 Further research 
posited that there could have been about three successive waves of 
 201. Id. at 1–2. 
 202. TallBear, supra note 192, at 13. 
 203. Constance Holden, Kennewick Man: Court Battle Ends, Bones Still Off-Limits, 
SCIENCE, July 30, 2004, at 55. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains & 
Contemporary Cultural Values, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583, 625–26 (1999). 
 206. See generally DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS 155–56 (2000). 
 207. See id. 
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human migration from northeast Asia, but that each of these groups 
shared a common ethnic identity as “Mongoloid” populations.208 
The “newest” scientific research challenges these theories and 
asserts that “not all early American populations were directly related 
to present-day Native Americans.”209 Under this view (which is based 
on a comparative study of early historic human skulls in North 
America) the “first arrivals” into North America were 
Paleoamericans who “were from south Asia or the Pacific Rim.”210 
These skeletons share “similar craniofacial features (skull form) 
[demonstrating a] shared common ancestry” and genetic relationship, 
which is quite different from those of the first Native American 
populations.211 Scientists allege that these peoples “probably shared 
ancestry with ancient Australians and other southern populations.”212 
They are distinct from the “second group of humans” to reach North 
America, who “arrived from northeast Asia or Mongolia . . . and gave 
rise to the modern Amerindians,” who were the ancestors of 
contemporary Native Americans.213 Thus, “according to this theory, 
the Paleoamericans are unrelated to most modern Amerindians and to 
the Native Americans.”214 Much of this work has been done by a 
group of scientists who have studied skulls of early populations in 
Baja California and other parts of Mexico.215 González-José’s study, 
for example, asserts that the skulls of the “Pericu” peoples of Baja 
California “closely resemble 8000–10,000 year old skulls unearthed 
in Brazil . . . [that] look strikingly like those of today’s Australian 
aborigines.”216 The article alleges that the Spanish conquest resulted 
in “the demise of the Pericu in the sixteenth century,” but that they 
were the “living links to America’s first settlers” until they were 
 208. See id. at 173. 
 209. Tom D. Dillehay, Tracking the First Americans, NATURE, Sept. 4, 2003, at 23. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Rolando González-José et al., Craniometric Evidence for Palaeoamerican 
Survival in Baja California, NATURE, Sept. 4, 2003, at 62. 
 216. Bruce Bower, Baja Skulls Shake Up American Ancestry, SCI. NEWS, Sept. 6, 2003, at 
150. 
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exterminated.217 The scientists assert that the Pericu were “unrelated 
to modern Native American and eastern Asian groups.”218 All of this 
research is founded upon craniometric analysis of the skulls, which 
demonstrates that the “Baja and Brazilian skulls exhibit telling 
similarities,” including “long, narrow braincases and short, thin faces, 
[which is] a pattern akin to that of modern inhabitants of southern 
Asia and South Pacific islands.”219 
The analysis of the Baja skulls is asserted to be remarkable 
evidence in support of the theory that the Americas had been peopled 
by a “double migratory event: a first migration led by 
Palaeoamericans originating from an ancestral population inhabiting 
Asia in pre-glacial times, and a second migration of the so called 
Mongoloids from which derived most of the modern 
Amerindians.”220 “If this hypothesis is correct,” the González-José 
team asserts, “we should observe relicts of the former 
Palaeoamerican stock somewhere in the New World, especially in 
geographically isolated areas where the lack of gene flow could have 
enabled the persistence of genetic and phenotypic ancestral traits.”221 
And this, the researchers contend, is made possible with the results of 
the Baja study.222 
The importance of this discussion to contemporary Native peoples 
seeking to protect their rights to ancestral human remains is obvious. 
It is no surprise that the lead plaintiff in the Kennewick case was 
Robson Bonnichsen, Director of the Center for the Study of the First 
Americans at Texas A&M University.223 Bonnichsen openly 
maintained that “[t]he court’s interpretation of NAGPRA” in the 
Kennewick case would “have ‘major implications’ in other cases in 
which Native groups” claim human remains.224 Bonnichsen cited, as 
an example of this, a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project in Texas 
in which “Native Americans at first claimed remains from a 4000-
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. González-José, supra note 215, at 62. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. Holden, supra note 203, at 591. 
 224. Id. 
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year-old burial ground,” but later reached a “compromise” so that 
“scientists will have access to them.”225 It is also no surprise that the 
scientific reaction to the Baja study is one of excitement about the 
profound implications of that study. Anthropologist Tom Dillehay 
sums up the discussion as follows: 
What we really want to know is what took place within and 
between these [early] populations, how they changed over 
time, and how quickly they changed. These issues can be 
resolved only by obtaining more skeletal data and by 
combining them with regional archaeological records, which 
should provide information on the social and cultural histories 
of the different populations.226 
There is light at the end of the tunnel for the theorists who assert 
that the “first Americans” were not “Native Americans.” Who were 
they? And who are contemporary Native Americans? If the definition 
of “indigenous” relates to a status of first in time, of being the 
“original” peoples of this land, then scientific studies may be used to 
demonstrate that Native Americans cannot factually make this claim. 
If the definition of “indigenous” relates to priority, as being prior to 
the first documented arrival of European peoples, then Native 
Americans are still “indigenous,” and yet their cultural right to 
protect ancestral remains is denied because they cannot prove the 
requisite “cultural affiliation” given the “scientific” evidence that 
these ancient people are not genetically related to contemporary 
Native Americans. 
So, where does all of this lead us? The “scientific racism” of the 
nineteenth century is alive and well in the twenty-first century. 
Today, many scientists claim ownership of these ancient skeletons 
and, in doing so, they purport to control the narrative about human 
origins. These theories are employed to provide a “factual basis” to 
deny the validity of Native traditions that establish the connection 
between contemporary Native peoples and the ancestral peoples 
“indigenous” to the lands that they shared for centuries prior to the 
arrival of the Europeans. “Indigenous” identity is up for grabs 
 225. Id. 
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through DNA analysis, through craniometrical analysis, and through 
a variety of other methods that attempt to establish “cultural” identity 
scientifically. “Cultural identity” is a euphemism for racial identity, 
and the genetic study of “populations” is merely a way to mask the 
true nature of these studies. So, the question is, who “owns” Native 
identity? And why are non-Native peoples engaged in an effort to 
appropriate “indigenous” identity for themselves? 
VI. INDIGENEITY AND WHITENESS: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 
Interestingly, the concept of “indigeneity” is being used by 
contemporary non-Native scholars arguing for the construction of 
“white culture.” For example, Christina Stage purports to use an 
“indigenous perspective” to examine “white culture” as expressed 
through “the communication patterns of an all-white rural community 
and the metaphors that shape its cultural identity.”227 She claims that 
“the explicit study of white culture is imperative in order fully to 
understand intercultural communication and the role of power and 
privilege in these encounters.”228 Thus, by examining a small, “all-
white” town in the Midwest, Stage claims that it is possible to gain 
“insight into how this segment of our population views its position 
within the center of society.”229 
Professor Stage claims that the need for “indigenous research” has 
been articulated by a variety of scholars. She draws on work by 
Nakayama and Krizeck that, according to Stage, asserts that “white is 
a relatively uncharted territory that has remained invisible as it 
continues to influence the identity of those both within and without 
its domain.”230 “Study of the center is never easy,” she states, because 
“[t]he place from which power is exercised is often a hidden 
place.”231 She also points to the work of white scholars indicating 
discomfort with their perception that “white is not anything” and 
 227. Christina Stage, We Celebrate 100 Years: An “Indigenous” Analysis of the Metaphors 
that Shape the Cultural Identity of Small Town, U.S.A., in WHITENESS: THE COMMUNICATION 
OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 69–70 (Thomas K. Nakayama & Judith N. Martin eds., 1999). 
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doesn’t represent an identity or any particular quality.232 Stage 
supports the work of scholars who “explore European American 
experience” and thereby “help fill the cultural void felt by many” 
white people, as well as expanding “our conceptualization of 
intercultural communication issues in the United States.”233 
Adding an “indigenous perspective” will provide “texture” to 
white identity.234 In particular, Stage examines the intersection of two 
points of white identity—“white” and “rural”—to understand 
“movement and communication within the center.”235 She sees the 
community of Laurel as a community that has “slipping into the 
margins of the center” and, like many rural communities across 
America, has become economically marginalized and perhaps 
politically disenfranchised as well.236 The “cultural identity” of this 
community, she claims, is distinctive and founded on a sense of 
shared history and experience that is different from other white 
groups “at the center.”237  
Is it possible that all groups have a claim to an “indigenous” 
identity to the extent that they have been living in a particular 
geographic region and have a shared sense of history and “cultural” 
traditions? So, a rural Montana ranching community is “indigenous” 
and so is a rural Appalachian coal mining community, or a rural 
Georgia farming community? Who is at the “center” and why does it 
matter? It matters because all of these “indigenous” populations are 
making a claim that they are somehow distinctive and marginalized 
in society. If this is perceived as true by society generally, then it 
goes a good distance toward proving Waldron’s argument that Native 
peoples are merely making group claims on the same basis as other 
purportedly “disadvantaged” groups and should enjoy no unique 
priority or entitlement to rights. The appropriation of “indigenous” 
identity in the politics of representation is obviously quite telling. 
The term “indigenous” has become a trope to argue for a broader 
entitlement to rights among various groups in society. This type of 
 232. Id. (discussing work by Richard Dyer). 
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appropriation evokes the unspoken assumption in American society 
that justice can be achieved for particular groups through the 
dominant society’s norms and institutions. Cheryl Harris points to the 
current attack on affirmative action laws and policies in support of 
her point that formal equality is used by the dominant society to 
protect power and privilege for white citizens.238 She advocates for a 
more expansive concept of affirmative action, similar to that in South 
Africa, which would permit a redistribution of property and power to 
truly “equalize” disparate groups. What would this process entail in 
the United States? Clearly, all groups are not situated “equally,” and 
true “equality” will only emerge from a recognition of their inherent 
differences. For Native Nations, this process necessarily entails a 
respect for their sovereignty and their unique political, legal, cultural 
and social institutions. Who owns “Indigenous” identity? That is a 
question for Native people, and it triggers discussion about “cultural 
appropriation” and “assimilation.” As we all know, one of the most 
powerful forms of assimilation is to appropriate the key cultural 
symbols of another group and transform them into part of the 
dominant society. This has occurred for years, as tribal names, 
religious icons, symbols, and places have been converted into 
symbols of the dominant society. Tribal names are used to refer to 
automobiles (the Jeep “Cherokee”), sacred symbols are used as 
commercial icons (“Kachina Cadillac”), and sacred places, such as 
the Black Hills, are carved into National Monuments for the United 
States (Mt. Rushmore). By taking core elements of Native culture and 
mass producing them as part of “American” culture, the entire notion 
of “indigeneity” becomes convoluted and contested. And now that 
“scientific” evidence is being used to challenge Native narratives that 
identify Native peoples as the “original” people of this land, entire 
narratives of Native America are being converted into a “scientific” 
narrative about the “true” identity of the first Americans. What is 
missing in all of this is an ethic of respect for Native values, identities 
and narratives, and the core concepts within Native epistemologies. 
 238. Harris, supra note 4, at 1778. 
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CONCLUSION 
In writing this essay, I came across an edited volume that 
presented the overarching ethical issues within the context of 
literature on whiteness.239 The essays in that volume probe how 
whiteness is constructed and practiced, how it structures social 
relations, and how it “produces power and is produced by power” in 
various social institutions,240 including legal and political institutions. 
The first chapter, entitled “Whiteness and the Great Law of Peace,”241 
describes the Great Law of Peace, which structured the “cooperative 
relations between five Iroquoian nations—Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, 
Oneida, and Onondaga—“as an example of ‘practical wisdom,’ that 
is, how to live well individually and collectively.”242 Within this 
framework, “[r]elations within the nation and with other peoples were 
placed in a context of proper living.”243 
The authors point out that one feature of the “white world view” 
that is not masked is its “universalizing tendency.”244 Whiteness 
“liquidates all others [in] its hegemonic discursive frames—such as 
civilization, modernization, progress, or development.”245 The truth 
of this observation is apparent in the historical development of 
international law, which gave rise to the discovery doctrine as a pillar 
for colonialism, and even in the current applications of international 
human rights law, which marginalize and subordinate the political 
status of indigenous peoples in relation to the nation-states. 
Moreover, the “engulfing presence of whiteness includes the loss 
of . . . the ability to recognize its historical contingency and the loss 
of the capacity to imagine alternative ways of living.”246 Thus, the 
historical and current legal and moral frameworks are perceived as 
representing a truth about the political and cultural status of divergent 
peoples. The authors compare modern Western thought, which often 
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views the human being as an individual “autonomous entity existing 
in a lifeless and disinterested cosmos,”247 with the Great Law of 
Peace, which expressed a “vision of human life as interconnected, as 
existing within a network of relationships.”248 
The system that Bedford and Workman describe can be 
analogized to what Deloria and Wildcat have referred to as the 
difference between Western and Native metaphysics.249 The Western 
scientific model, with its categories, hierarchies, and mechanistic 
world view, is replicated in law and in the secular models of ethics 
that form the predominant framework for evaluating moral issues 
within liberal societies.250 Native epistemologies, in comparison, 
which tend to see the Universe as a web of life, in constant motion 
and balance, give rise to an ethics of responsibility, which imposes 
reciprocal duties and obligations among all of its constituent entities, 
both human and nonhuman.251 Within Native ethical systems, there is 
a pervasive belief that every aspect of the natural world has a spiritual 
essence and this context informs human experience.252 Under this 
ethical structure, the essence of “human” identity is a spiritual and 
not a scientific enterprise.  
The only way in which Native ethical systems can be appreciated 
is within the context of specific tribal epistemologies. The indigenous 
peoples of this land maintain an important basis of knowledge and 
wisdom that can teach a great deal about the place that we now call 
the United States. The United States, as a nation, is so young 
compared to the indigenous nations of this land. Americans search 
for an “indigenous” identity within their scientific and secular 
models, but they forget the most important thing of all: “Wisdom sits 
in Places.” This is the title of Keith Basso’s work on the tribal 
narratives of the Western Apache people, in which they memorialize 
 247. Id. at 29. 
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their cultural histories through association with particular sites and 
places.253 The brash assertions of geneticists that they can prove 
cultural affiliation by DNA testing can never replace the cultural 
histories of the indigenous peoples of this land, which tell us who 
they are and how they came to be. 
 253. KEITH BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE AMONG THE 
WESTERN APACHE (1996).  
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